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Num mundo cada vez mais interligado pode-se afi rmar que os eventos que se desenrolam 
de um lado do globo irão afectar o lado oposto. Abundam provas desta situação, tanto no 
mundo da economia, como nas relações internacionais. Neste ambiente, até uma super-
potência, como os Estados Unidos da América, encontra-se limitado na sua busca de fazer 
valer a sua infl uência ao nível global, principalmente pois esse objectivo é idêntico ao de 
outros actores.
Um pequeno estado, como Portugal, com muito menos recursos e a braços com uma difícil 
situação económica, vê-se face a uma situação ainda mais complexa. Em virtude dessa 
situação, Portugal possui uma necessidade ainda mais premente de prever e conseguir 
lidar com as situações que possam surgir. A sua posição de maior fragilidade torna-o mais 
susceptível às ondas de choque que percorrem o sistema internacional como consequência 
de eventos distantes. Nesta situação, um pequeno estado tem a necessidade de aplicar a sua 
infl uência nos locais que lhe são de maior interesse, enquanto simultaneamente tenta prever 
e precaver-se contra eventos que possam limitar a sua liberdade de acção para implementar 
a sua Estratégia Nacional. 
De modo a perceber como um pequeno estado defi ne as suas prioridades, as organiza entre 
si e aplica o seu poder nacional para lhes dar resposta, este artigo aborda inicialmente os 
conceitos base de objectivo nacional, interesse nacional e poder nacional. Seguidamente 
propõe-se uma possível sistematização para uma escala de prioridade para os interesses 
nacionais e elaboram-se algumas considerações sobre a aplicação do poder nacional.
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Abstract 
In a world ever more interconnected, we can now truly say that what happens on one side of the 
globe will affect events on the other. Evidence of this abounds not only in examination of the 
world economy, but also in foreign affairs.  However, even a superpower like the United States 
of America finds itself strained attempting to exert its influence worldwide, especially when 
other actors have the same goal. 
A small country like Portugal, with even fewer resources and in the midst of a challenging 
economic situation, faces an even harder situation. As a result, Portugal must better predict and 
manage events because its weaker position makes it more fragile to distant events whose 
consequences ripple throughout the international system. In such a situation, a small country 
needs to exert its influence in locations that are more important to it and also predict events that 
might constrain its national strategy.  
In order to understand how a small country defines its priorities, establishes priorities amongst 
them and applies its national power, this article discusses the concepts of national objective, 
national interest and national power. Having defined these concepts it proposes an approach to 
a prioritization system to national interests and considers the application of national power. 
 
Keywords: National Power, National Strategy, National Interests, Threat Assessment, Foreign 
Policy. 
 
 
Resumo 
Num mundo cada vez mais interligado pode-se afirmar que os eventos que se desenrolam de um 
lado do globo irão afectar o lado oposto. Abundam provas desta situação, tanto no mundo da 
economia, como nas relações internacionais. Neste ambiente, até uma superpotência, como os 
Estados Unidos da América, encontra-se limitado na sua busca de fazer valer a sua influência ao 
nível global, principalmente pois esse objectivo é idêntico ao de outros actores. 
Um pequeno estado, como Portugal, com muito menos recursos e a braços com uma difícil 
situação económica, vê-se face a uma situação ainda mais complexa. Em virtude dessa situação, 
Portugal possui uma necessidade ainda mais premente de prever e conseguir lidar com as 
situações que possam surgir. A sua posição de maior fragilidade torna-o mais susceptível às 
ondas de choque que percorrem o sistema internacional como consequência de eventos 
distantes. Nesta situação, um pequeno estado tem a necessidade de aplicar a sua influência nos 
locais que lhe são de maior interesse, enquanto simultaneamente tenta prever e precaver-se 
contra eventos que possam limitar a sua liberdade de acção para implementar a sua Estratégia 
Nacional.  
De modo a perceber como um pequeno estado define as suas prioridades, as organiza entre si e 
aplica o seu poder nacional para lhes dar resposta, este artigo aborda inicialmente os conceitos 
base de objectivo nacional, interesse nacional e poder nacional. Seguidamente propõe-se uma 
possível sistematização para uma escala de prioridade para os interesses nacionais e elaboram-se 
algumas considerações sobre a aplicação do poder nacional. 
 
Palavras-chave: Poder Nacional, Estratégia Nacional, Interesses Nacionais, Análise de Risco, 
Relações Internacionais. 
Introduction 
 
In 1999, Joseph S. Nye wrote an essay in Foreign Affairs in which he called for a redefinition of 
the United States national interests. The article commenced with a discussion of the 
intervention of Kosovo and the question “how should the United States define its interests in 
today’s world?” (Nye,1999). This question is still pertinent, gaining perhaps even more 
importance if one considers the grave economic situation that the United States and many 
countries in the European Union are facing today. As João Marques de Almeida, asserted, 
“when there is less money, a better strategy is demanded” (Almeida, 2010: 81). 
The sovereign debt crisis that has been recently affecting many countries limits their available 
resources, thereby impacting their ability to operate in the international system. Close 
examination reveals several examples throughout history where States and Empires collapsed 
under the weight of insurmountable external pressures to which they attempted to overcome 
until they exhausted their resources. One such example is the collapse the Portuguese Empire in 
the XVth Century, when the pressures of maintaining the network of forts in Northern Africa 
and India drained the kingdom of money and able men. A more contemporary example can be 
found in the case of the Soviet Union, whose fall was prompted by the strain of the arms race 
the fight for a global sphere of influence against an economically stronger opponent, the United 
States. 
While the United States has today achieved a global status that far exceeds anything ever seen, 
they still face many of these same limitations. The strain caused by this decade’s campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has had a severe impact on the country’s economy, amounting to over 
three trillion dollars to date (Stiglitz e Blimes, 2008). Further, its impact has not been limited to 
economic implications. The US armed forces were pushed to their limits, constraining their 
ability to respond to further solicitations, which will become evident in future altercations. Also 
affected was the international policing system, as evidenced by the expansion of NATO’s realm 
of influence to include the entire globe, as well as the doubt raised over the legitimacy of the 
intervention in Iraq, which created a gap in the traditionally staunch Euro-Atlantic alliance. 
Some consequences remain to be seen, and the full extent of their repercussions may not be 
evident for years. However, the actions undertaken were deemed necessary in order to achieve 
an adequate conclusion for the involved nations. 
As the only remaining superpower, the United States plays a different role than most other 
nation states. This does not mean, however, that other states do not have interests that they 
want to see protected or that they want to reach. 
A small power1, such as Portugal, has less power to exert than a hegemonic actor, such as the 
United States, however it still has national objectives that it intends to reach. Additionally, 
smaller nation states will usually be more influenced by events occurring on the international 
stage, like, for instance, economical crises. Faced with restrictions resulting from a limited 
sphere of influence, small nations have further need to prioritize their interests in order to best 
utilize their resources to respond to the actions of other, larger actors in the international scene 
while still reaching their national objectives.  As such this theme gains greater relevance to a 
country such as Portugal that needs to optimize the use of its power. 
The present article intends to answer the following questions: how does a small power defines 
its priorities? How does can it prioritize amongst them? Where does it apply its national power? 
In order to answer these questions, we will first discuss the concepts referred to above, such as 
national objectives, national interests and national power. Having defined these concepts we will 
then propose an approach to a prioritization system to national interests, which will lead us to 
consider how to deal with differing scales of influence and interest. 
 

1 It is hard to reach a consensual definition of “small power”, however for the present article we will consider that it is a state with 
“less responsabilities, less interests, less money and less canons” as opposed to the rest of the world powers (Gaspar, 2007:113). For 
the purpose of this article we will consider that small powers are those actors in international relations that don’t have the 
capabilities to influence decisively the international system on their own. 
 
On national objectives, national interests and national power 
 
When studying a nation state’s national strategy,2 one first needs to consider its national 
objectives. These objectives are the guidelines by which the state conducts itself – the aspirations 
of the state. They can be characterized as being constant in their definition and in time (Cabral 
Couto, 1988: 64), usually appearing in the State’s Constitution.3 These objectives are the 
fundamental goals of the political entity that is the State and can be summed up by the two 
abstract concepts “Security” and “Social well being and Progress”. In certain cases, “Prestige” 
and “Imposition of Ideology” are useful additional concepts to consider, though they are 
generally considered to be less reliable indicators (Cabral Couto, 1988: 64). It can be proposed 
that these last two objectives are exhibited only after the first two requirements have been met 
and consolidated, freeing the resources to expand the State’s influence. Thus, as its status in the 
international arena grows, so will the weight of these last two factors in its national strategy. It 
should be noted that while the first two objectives are mainly defensive and inward looking, the 
second set is more aggressive and outward looking. 
It is from the national objectives of a state that its national interests are derived, which can be 
defined as intermediate objectives that need to be achieved in order to reach the desired end 
result. These vary with international trends and conjecture, and form the basis of the State’s 
foreign policy. Despite contending that the concept of national interests is more or less open for 
debate, Nye presents the following definition: “in a democracy, the national interest is simply 
the set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world” (Nye, 1999). Thus, for 
the purpose of this article, we will consider that national interests are the intermediate goals in 
the international arena that a State determines it needs to reach in order to accomplish its 
national objectives. 
At this juncture, it is useful to note that that there exists a difference between the Portuguese 
and the Anglo-Saxon Strategic Schools; in the Portuguese school, “objectivos nacionais” and 
“interesses nacionais” appear as close terms, often being used interchangeably (Cabral Couto, 
1988: 64). A critique can be made regarding this peculiarity of the Portuguese School, as it 
removes some of the specificity in discussions of national strategy and national interests. The 
use of two distinct terms allows for a clearer distinction between the permanent goals of the 
State that are only altered in very specific situations that imply a fundamental change in the 
State and the intermediate goals, which are conjectural and as such are under constant revision. 
This distinction has several advantages, such as easing conceptual and theoretical discussions as 
well as allowing for clearer political documents. Note however that here we are only considering 
a clearer separation of the terms “objectivos nacionais” and “interesses nacionais”.  The first one 
standing for the vital permanent objectives of the State, while the second are conjectural 
objectives that are midterm objectives needed to reach in order to reach the end goal. 
In order to reach its national objectives, the State must use the resources available to it. These 
resources, both material and immaterial, constitute the “power” that the State possesses. 
Raymond Aron wrote that “power (…) is the capacity to do, produce or destroy”, defining it as 
“the capacity a political unit has to impose its will on others” (Aron, 1986: 99). Nye takes a 
slightly different approach, defining power as “the capacity of attaining our objectives or ends” 
(Nye, 2002: 70). From the Portuguese School one notable definition is that of Cabral Couto, 

2 National Strategy can be defined as “the art of the dialectic of wills using force to resolve (…) conflicts” (Beaufre, 1998: 34) 
deriving from a certain State aiming at attaining a contested goal (such as supremacy in a geographical area). A synonym to this 
term is “Grand Strategy” (Dorff, 2001: 11).  
3 In the case of Portugal they are presented in the 9th article of National Constitution under the title of “Fundamental Tasks of the 
State”. Of these tasks one can stress some such as: “To guarantee national independence and create the political, economic, social 
and cultural conditions that promote it” (art. 9.a), “to promote the well-being and quality of life of the people and real equality 
amongst the Portuguese, as well as the enforcement of their economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, through the 
transformation and modernization of economic and social structures” (art. 9.d) and “to protect and value the Portuguese people’s 
cultural heritage, to protect nature and the environment, to preserve natural resources and to ensure ensure proper planning of the 
territory” (art. 9e) (Assembleia da Républica, 2005:3). 
which states that power is “the set of forces of any nature, moral or material, that a State can use 
to support its strategy” (Cabral Couto, 1988: 241) Another similar definition, put forth by 
Carvalho, extrapolates on the former definition by adding that “a State, or coalition of States, 
can use [it] against an antagonist , aiming to impose its will, or to preserve its freedom of action, 
in order to achieve its objectives” (Carvalho, 1986: 15). Despite their differences, all definitions 
present power as the tool for a State to obtain its objectives. 
National Power has several characteristics that define it (Cabral Couto, 1988: 40-42). The first 
is its relativity, which refers to the fact that it can only be understood when taking into 
consideration the power relations of the involved entities. It is situational and subjective, gaining 
meaning and significance from the specific environment and circumstances of the occurrence, as 
well as from the interpretation of other actors involved. It is personalized, because the inherent 
individuality of State leaders will influence the application of the power. National power has no 
convertibility - the strengths from which power is derived cannot be converted from one form to 
another. It is multidimensional, as it is composed of multiple different sources. It is time bound, 
only having meaning during a specific period of time. It is instrumental; power isn’t an end on 
itself being only the mean. Last but not least power is morally neutral, its usage dependent on 
those responsible for it. 
National Power is difficult to measure, despite many attempts made by various authors. In the 
past, the typical approach has been to study the potential power that a given State possessed. 
Perhaps the most well known formula using this approach is the Cline Equation4. Regardless, 
one constant in formulas and measurements is that they attempt to obtain a value from the 
combination of the State’s tangible strengths (such as its military and economical capabilities) 
and its intangible strengths (such as national will and the quality of its strategy). While the 
former can usually be fairly precisely assessed, the latter can only be hypothesized, and often are 
distorted by errors in judgment. One such example of misjudgment occurred during an appraisal 
by the United States government on the ability of the Portuguese Government to sustain a 
military campaign in its colony.  They estimated that in six months the war would be over and 
Portugal would be militarily defeated…It lasted fourteen years and ended only because of a 
revolution on the mainland. This example provides us with two important insights regarding 
the study of national power - firstly on the subjectivity of the appraisal of a country’s potential 
and secondly on the importance of the immaterial factors of national power. 
 
 
A possible way to prioritize national interests 
 
No matter how one looks at national power, it stems from limited resources, thus its use needs 
to be analyzed and evaluated in order to achieve maximum results. In the following part of the 
article we will approach the prioritization of national interests in order to allow a better 
allocation of this limited resource. This is of great interest to politicians, who need to optimally 
manage their resources in order to achieve their goals. 
In 1999, Carton and Perry developed a scale to classify and prioritize threats, which can easily 
be applied to the study of national interests. Their scale was comprised of three distinct levels: 
“A-Level” threats are those that directly endanger the survival of the State, “B-Level” are those 
that affect the State’s interests without endangering its survival and “C-Level” are those that 
may constrain the State’s security without directly affecting its interests (Carton & Perry, 
1999:11). This scale can be compared with the one presented by Cabral Couto analyzing 
national objectives, classifying them as being vital, important or secondary. The first level of 
objectives, those considered vital, concerns those that are essential for the survival of the state, 
and for which it will mobilize its full weight to achieve. The important objectives are those that 

4 R. S. Cline proposed in 1975 that a State’s potential could be measured by the following equation: Pp=(C+E+M)x(S+W), where P 
is Perceived Potential, C is Critical Mass (a measure obtained from the size of the territory and of the population), E is the 
economical capacity, M is the military capacity, S is the value and coherency of the National Strategy and W is the National Will 
(Cabral Couto, 1988: 248-249). 
are relevant for the execution of national strategy without endangering the national security of 
the State, necessitating the allocation of proportional resources to achieve the desired end. 
Secondary objectives are those that may assist the implementation of national objectives 
without, however, endangering neither them nor the security of the State (Cabral Couto, 1988: 
65-66). 
The similarities between these two scales is immediately evident, however Cabral Couto further 
developed his scale, especially by taking into consideration the idea that objectives can be also 
defined by their timeline as ultimate, distant, intermediate or present; by their constancy, if they 
are permanent or variable; by the amplitude, if they are general or sectorial (Cabral Couto, 1988: 
306-310). 
If one analyzes national objectives through the lens of the above article, they can be 
characterized as vital, permanent and general. National interests, however can be further 
classified into distinct categories informed by the factors mentioned above. We think that two 
other factors should also be considered: associated risk and capability of action. 
The discussion of associated risk refers to the probability of a given interest realistically being 
affected by the actions of another state. For instance, any one state theoretically presents a threat 
to the independence of another5, however the current international situation makes it hard to 
believe that, for example, Spain would invade Portugal so the associated risk of such an event 
coming to pass is virtually nonexistent. 
The capacity to influence the events surrounding these national interests must also be taken into 
consideration when trying to prioritize and optimally manage such interests. In this case, the 
concept can best be exemplified through the study of military tactics of in terms of area of 
operations, area of influence and area of interest. The area of operation is the specific 
geographical area where the unit is acting; the area of influence is an area surrounding area of 
operations that the weapons of the unit can reach, thereby influencing events there, and the area 
of influence is an area where events that unfold within its perimeters may influence the situation 
of the unit but that the unit has no means of influencing. If we extrapolate upon these concepts 
to the level of the nation state, the area of operation would be its territory, where it has 
sovereignty; the area of influence would be the geographical area where it can exert pressure (on 
whatever level it deems necessary) to make other States comply6; and the area of interest would 
be critical geographical areas whose importance derives from the resources there available (ex. 
the Middle East with petroleum) and the routes that cross that area (ex. maritime straights such 
as the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal). This distinction is important because while one can 
have some say over what happens in both its “area of operations” and “area of influence”, there 
will always be areas of interest that will be beyond reach (sometimes even if the said state is a 
superpower). 
If one considers the aforementioned factors, a multidimensional scale to study and classify 
national interests begins to take shape. The first level would determine if the interest is vital, 
important or secondary. At that point, a more precise distinction could be made utilizing a 
timeline - if it is an ultimate, distant, intermediate or actual interest. Recognizing the role that 
time constraints play is important because the window of opportunity in which to take action 
must be taken into consideration.  The third element factored in should be the scope of the 
interest, whether it is general or sector wise interest, with priority being given to those that are 
general, as more general interests obviously have a wider range of application and possibility of 
consequence. A fourth factor to take into account would be the risk associated with that 
interest. In order to achieve an accurate measurement of the risk associated with a given interest, 
one must first calculate the probability of a negative outcome, wherein the higher the risk, the 
higher the priority. Lastly, the possibility of the actor to influence the outcome should be 
considered, whether it be directly, indirectly or not at all. Analyzing and measuring national 

5 This conclusion derives from the definition of threat as the product of a capacity by a will, and since the capacity exists one can 
never consider the will to be zero. 
6 Here one can consider that for a superpower it would be the whole world and for a regional hegemon the region where it exerts its 
hegemony. 
interests in such a way one would provide a list of priorities where the national objectives that 
are vital, actual, general, present a high risk and can (and must) be directly influenced would 
appear at one end of the spectrum and at the other end the secondary, ultimate, sectorial, low 
risk, non influenced interests.  
A scale such as that proposed above would assist politicians establish an order of priorities, 
however it would need to frequently be checked and reevaluated, and cannot guarantee that 
there would be some overlap and ambiguity in the status of multiple interests, particularly at the 
lower end of the scale 7. It also must be understood that one cannot underestimate society’s 
pressure to change priorities on politicians, something that has been affected by the “CNN 
effect”8. 
In order to apply this scaling method to the national interests of Portugal one would need to 
first identify them. 
The first source that must be employed in order to determine the national objectives is the 
official documents of the nation. 
The National Constitution is the principal document to be studied, where the previously 
mentioned national objectives may be found.   In the Portuguese Constitution, they are found in 
the 9ºArticle. This article outlines the main objectives of the State, presenting a mix of vital, 
main and secondary objectives, which are derived from the main purpose of any State, to 
guarantee Security and Well Being. The interests defined there are both permanent and long 
term. 
A secondary source utilized to find the national interests of Portugal is the National Defense 
Strategy Concept. This official document establishes guidelines where the government expresses 
what it sees as the main interests that need to be defended and identifies ground rules on how to 
achieve it. From the National Defense Strategy Concept of 2003 one can identify the following 
goal: the defense and securitization of the strategic space of permanent interest defined as the 
national territory, the circulation paths amongst the mainland and the islands in Azores and 
Madeira, the maritime and aerial area under Portuguese control and the Exclusive Economic 
Zone belonging to Portugal (Conselho de Ministros, 2003: 284). Also defined are the areas of 
strategic interest to Portugal which include the Euro-Atlantic Area, the States with which 
Portugal has borders, the region of the Maghreb, the South Atlantic (particularly Brasil)9, 
Portuguese speaking countries in Africa and Timor, countries where there is a large Portuguese 
community, countries or regions with historical and cultural ties to Portugal and countries of 
origin of the main migrant communities in Portugal (Conselho de Ministros, 2003: 284). These 
are the areas that are of vital interest to the State as well as the areas where Portugal has main 
interests, however those interests are not clearly defined. 
A final important official document, where one can find these interests expressed, is the 
government program, in which an elected government presents the objectives it has set for itself 
for the duration of its mandate. In the current Portuguese government10 program, the priorities 
expressed are: the European Union policies, the relationships with the Portuguese Language 
Community countries, the Atlantic relation with the United States and NATO, the current 
mandate in the UN Security Council11, the current changes taking place in the Maghreb and the 
Israelo-Palestinian peace process and re-establishing the links with Portuguese emigrant 
communities abroad (Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 2011: 105). 
Official documents are not, however, the only source where one can find documentation of 
national objectives.  Indeed, these are usually more clearly expressed in government officials’ 
statements or in articles written by individuals involved in think tanks. In 2009, for instance, the 

7 Here the preferences of the politics and society’s perception on the subject will be relevant to order the conflicting interests. 
8 The “CNN effect” was presented by Steven Livingstone in a paper in 1997, he states that the importance that the media give to a 
certain subject will have an impact on policy, acting as an accelerant to the decision making process, as an impediment to certain 
actions because of the social impact they have or as an agenda setting agency giving relevance to a certain subject that wasn’t a state’s 
priority to begin with (Livingstone, 1997:2). 
9 Perhaps in a future strategic concept Angola will also be singled out due to its increasing importance. 
10 The XIXth Constitutional Government. 
11 Portugal is one of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council for the 2011-2012 mandate. 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Amado, presented at a conference at the Instituto de 
Defesa Nacional what he identified as the Portuguese main interests: the promotion of Portugal 
Economic interests abroad, namely by trying to stimulate exports and attract foreign investment; 
the valorization of the Portuguese language abroad, principally in international organizations, by 
getting it admitted as one of the United Nations official languages; the involvement of Portugal, 
in the then developing European Union Foreign Policy; the reinforcement of the Portuguese 
Speaking Countries Community, mainly its economic and political dimensions; the inter-
Atlantic relationship and the then discussed reviewing of the NATO Strategy; the development 
of the relationship between Portugal and the South American countries, Africa, the Arab States 
and the developing countries in Southeastern Asia, and China  (Amado, 2010: 142-148). 
If one analyzes the lists above presented and tries to organize them according to the scale 
described above, the following list of interests emerges: 
• As vital, general, permanent and ultimate interest: the defense of the strategic 
Portuguese space. 
• As important, general, permanent and ultimate interest: the reinforcement of Portugal’s 
Place in the international (United Nations), regional (European Union and NATO) and 
political/cultural (Portuguese Speaking Countries Community) organizations. These 
organizations leverage Portugal’s power, reinforcing its position in their specific area but also 
giving the Portuguese diplomacy further strength. 
• As important, specific (economy), permanent and long term interest: the development 
of the economical links with countries within Portugal area of strategic interest. 
• As secondary, specific (diplomacy), conjectural and short/medium term interest: the 
reinforcement of the Portuguese diplomacy intervention in Middle East peace process. 
This is but a brief analysis that, in real world application, would need to incorporate and include 
other official statements and documents, as well as the analysis of the geopolitical and 
geostrategic environment. 
 
 
A possible application of national power to reach the national interests 
 
In order to achieve proposed national interests, a State must analyze the resources available and 
apply them as best it can to maximize their success and effectiveness. However, as previously 
mentioned, power is relative, dependent on many factors, including the subject, the actors 
involved etc. Nye proposed that power is tridimensional with a military, an economic and a 
diplomatic vector (Nye, 1999). 
Portugal is a small country and is currently undergoing a deep economic crisis, but it still has 
national interests that it needs to see protected and goals that it needs to achieve. In the face of 
such a perilous position, Portugal needs more than ever to prioritize those interests in order to 
have success.  
If employing the division of national power as considered by Nye, one finds that Portugal is 
deeply limited in the first two vectors. Militarily speaking, Portugal is in 46th position in 
conventional military capacity, between Chile and Venezuela12, however in military spending it 
is ranked in the 66th position, between Sierra Leone and Uganda13. In the economic vector 
Portugal presents severe shortcomings with a low growth rate, a high trade deficit and low 
saving14, being thus limited in using its economy has a foreign policy tool.  
The biggest strength that Portugal possesses and has long used to achieve its interests is its 
diplomatic capability. Through history there have been innumerable examples involving 
Portuguese diplomacy managing important victories, from the creation of the State to the 
present day when it won the elections to a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security 

12 According to the ranking available at globalfirepower.com consulted on 30SET11. 
13 According to the data available in the CIA World Factbook available at cia.gov consulted on 30SET11. 
14 According to the data available in the CIA World Factbook the growth rate is of available at cia.gov consulted on 30SET11. 
Council for the 2011-2012 mandate, against Canada. The strength of   Portuguese diplomacy 
now as well as in the past, is based on the intelligent use of its soft power, which in the present 
day is greatly reinforced by the presence of Portugal in several important regional and political 
organizations. Another strength has been the functional power15 that Portugal’s government has 
identified over time and taken advantage of (Moreira, 2000: 60).  Included in the utilized 
resources are the geostrategic position of the Azores archipelago and, more recently, the 
deployment of military contingents without caveats in operational theaters, such as Afghanistan. 
Without a significant change in Portugal’s situation, the approach chosen so far appears to be 
the best choice, and from the goals described in the various documents previously referred to, it 
is clear that the main concerns are the reinforcement of diplomatic capability and the presence 
in different international, regional and/or cultural alliances to which Portugal belongs. This 
approach allows the nation to secure its national and security objectives while simultaneously 
reinforcing Portugal’s position in the global arena.  This heightened presence and influence in 
these organizations provides Portugal with greater power leverage that it would not otherwise 
have. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article we have reviewed the concepts of national objectives, national interests and 
national power, presented a possible scale to prioritize the national interests and presented how 
Portugal uses its national power to defend its interests. 
A small power such as Portugal has to set clearly its priorities, giving precedence to those that 
may compromise its national objectives as well as those that may influence its powerbase. 
Currently, in the case of Portugal, the vital interests, at least in terms of national security, do not 
seem to be threatened, however, vital and secondary interests are always being discussed. The 
use of a scale, such as that proposed, allows for the identification of key priorities and reduces 
bias through the establishment of a scientific approach in discussing such topics. This will result 
in higher consensus and continuity in the discussion and implementation of National Strategy. 
One can identify an interest (or four slightly dissimilar interests) for Portugal that need to be set 
and explained to the public as a national priority, which is the participation and involvement in 
international, regional and political organizations. Membership in these organizations gives 
leverage to Portugal, allowing it to secure its position in the world. Participation in NATO, 
with the deployment of troops for missions and securing needed capabilities, allows Portugal to 
augment the military power it has available to it for defensive action significantly, securing the 
integrity of its territory. Likewise, as a member of the European Union and of the Euro zone, 
the economic potential of Portugal is strengthened. The presence of Portugal in both of these 
organizations, as well as in the Portuguese Speaking Countries Community, provides Portugal 
with the principal weapon in its arsenal - diplomatic ability. Only by guarding these interests 
and maintaining a world system based on international legitimacy and non-violent conduct can 
Portugal avoid falling from the category of small state to that of “exiguous states”16 (Moreira, 
2009). 
This is only a brief approach to a topic that should be at the front of the debate on the strategic 
concept. Faced with a perilous economic situation, these questions should be deeply analyzed 
and publicly discussed. The lack of such a debate leads to incomprehension on the part of the 
population regarding government behavior which has been shown to have a significant effect on 
the (un)success of a particular policy.  
A parallel issue to the one introduced that has not been presented in this paper, as it falls 
beyond its scope, is the importance of the intelligence services in the process. A competent 

15 Functional power consists in the power that a small state can acquire over a more powerful state because of possession of an 
important resource or location to this actor (Carvalho, 1986: 23). 
16 Professor Adriano Moreira created the term of “exiguous state” to characterize a State that can no longer ensure the purposes for 
which it was created. 
diplomacy needs to be based in correct information to help assist the decision making process. 
The capacity to anticipate problems is a great advantage particularly for a country whose main 
strength comes from its diplomacy.  
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